Rather than tacitly coordinating directly on price, which appears to be difficult in this market, coordination on supply in the form of maintaining a broad market share division in the EU market is feasible.

coordination on supply into the EU.

The joint venture facilitates coordination on supply into the EU.

Over and above the likely negative impact on prices resulting from the joint capacity decisions, the transaction may also facilitate coordination on supply into the EU.

The product is very homogenous and facilitates coordination.

In this connection, when the contract to set up the companies is signed, a mark‐up on a reference interest rate determined according to the comparable core‐capital instruments traded on the market will be calculated on the basis of the long‐term rating of LBB, taking into account the discontinuation of institutional and guarantor liability (Anstaltslast and Gewährträgerhaftung) and in compliance with the contractual form of the dormant holdings.

The section of the IBB special needed for the capitalisation of BGB will be invested by the Land in one or more holdings in LBB and will bear interest at market rates. At the time these dormant partnerships are formed, in view of LBB's long‐term rating (leaving aside the public institutional and guarantor liability) and having regard to the contractual structure of the dormant holdings, a premium will be determined at a reference interest rate in line with those of comparable core‐capital instruments traded on the market.

Measure 1: In March 2001 gbb Beteiligungs-AG (‘gbb’), a subsidiary of Deutsche Ausgleichsbank, a public-law development bank, provided until end-2010 a participation (‘’) to Bike Systems amounting to EUR 2070732. According to Germany, the participation was provided on market conditions and so did not constitute state aid.

According to Germany and BayernLB, there was an understanding that BayernLB would cover the capital requirements for expanding its commercial activities largely by accepting contributions from institutional investors.

According to Germany, in the wake of the Sydney Declaration by the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, a fungible market for contributions developed which characterised by broad diversification on the investor side, with investors ranging from private investors to large institutional investors.

An investor could not therefore expect to receive the same remuneration for a contribution as for equity instruments recognised for supervisory purposes for an unlimited period.

According to Germany, therefore, in comparing the remunerations, the trade tax effect of 0,26 % a year in relation to Helaba's contribution had to be taken into account.

According to information provided by Germany, however, in making the market comparison of the silent partnership of the Land of Hessen, the trade tax effect of (in relation to Helaba's ) 0,26 % a year must be taken into account.

However, under [...] pursuant to Section 10(4) of the German Banking Act, specific provision been made, in the event of losses, for the junior-ranking retrospective payment requirement typical of contributions.

Instead, Helaba had to pay the trade tax applicable to the of the .

Silent partnership contributions to credit institutions were usually provided by institutional investors which themselves to pay the trade tax on the remuneration received.

In its place, Helaba had to pay the trade tax applicable to the of the contribution.

The partner did not have a holding in the undertaking and had only rudimentary rights of control.

This business risk justified the existence of a partnership (so-called atypical silent partnership), the ranking of the silent partnership contribution for tax purposes as partnership equity capital and the non-deductibility of the partner's profit share as operating expenditure on the part of Helaba.

The silent partner had by law no voting right, and the market did not grant any remuneration for the partner's ‘waiving’ of the possibility of exercising influence.